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ABSTRACT 
 
 
AUSTIN, KP (1993)  The identification of mistakes in road accident records - part 1 : the use of 
geographic information systems, ITS Working Paper 406.  Institute for Transport Studies, 
University of Leeds, Leeds. 
 
The current method of checking police reported road accident data involves a rigorous process of 
manual and computer validation, with the objective of removing all the errors that exist on the 
accident report forms.  This paper shows how a Geographic Information System (GIS) can be used 
to identify any mistakes that remain after this process has been undertaken by comparing variables 
on the accident report forms with accurate highway feature information obtained from other 
sources.  The mistakes in the variables of district, speed limit, road class and road number were less 
than 10 per cent, less than 20 per cent for junction control, junction detail and pedestrian crossing 
facilities and over 20 per cent for carriageway type. 
 
If highway data was routinely entered onto a GIS the above variables may not need to be contained 
on the police accident report forms, reducing the number of items collected nationally by over 2.2 
million per year. 
 
KEY-WORDS:  
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THE IDENTIFICATION OF MISTAKES IN ROAD ACCIDENT 
RECORDS - PART 1 : THE USE OF GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION 
SYSTEMS 
 
 
1.INTRODUCTION 
 
The ultimate objective of road safety engineering and education is to provide for the safe movement 
of people throughout the highway network.  Those locations and population groups that have higher 
levels of accidents than the norm need to be identified.  The basic source of data for this purpose 
comes from the police, who complete an accident report form (STATS 19) for all road traffic 
accidents involving personal injury that they attend or are notified of.  This information is subjected 
to a series of manual and computer checks to identify any inaccuracies and would then be used for 
various safety studies. 
 
Several investigations have been undertaken to assess the validity of accident records.  Shinar et al 
(1983) compared the information on 124 police reports with that collected by Multi-Disciplinary 
Accident Investigation (MDAI) teams.  They found the most inaccurate highway feature data was 
gradient, speed limit, surface composition and curvature.  Howard et al (1979) found that controls 
upon the road, intersection type, traffic conditions and gradient were the most incorrectly recorded 
variables.  Questionnaire studies of local authorities (Ibrahim and Silcock, 1992, Austin, 1993) 
showed the location of the accident to be the most inaccurately defined variable. 
 
Unfortunately, these studies only concentrate on the mistakes that are made by the police which 
must be expected given the situations they face at the scene of a road traffic accident.  These 
mistakes do not matter provided a validation system can identify all of them, although any that 
remain can have a substantial impact on safety investigation.  Those accidents that are coded 
incorrectly will alter the total number of accidents relating to a certain feature, whilst those that are 
wrongly located will alter the number of accidents at certain sites, reducing the validity of site 
investigation studies. 
 
The objective of this paper is to show how a Geographic Information System (GIS) can be used to 
identify any mistakes that remain after the validation process has been completed.  A GIS is a 
computer program that identifies the location of an object and provides information about it 
enabling spatial and statistical analyses to be performed.   This project used PC ARC/INFO which is 
the most popular GIS in British local authorities with a market share of around 22 per cent, almost 
double that of the next most popular package, produced by Alper Systems (Campbell,1991).  The 
digital map used was the Ordnance Survey Centre-line Alignment of Roads (OSCAR) and covered 
a five kilometre square of north Hull.  Between 1987 and 1991 a total of 1884 accidents occurred 
within this area.  Certain items coded onto the accident records were compared with the same items 
taken from road network data so that mistakes in the coding of these items and in the locating of 
accidents could be identified.  
 
 
2.CURRENT VALIDATION PROCEDURE 
 
The accident data that are made available for safety studies are collected by the police.  A STATS 
 
 
 
19 record is completed for all injury accidents they attend or are notified of.  This contains details of 
the highway features at the location and the vehicles, drivers and casualties involved in the accident. 
 The data entry and validation process described in this section relates to the county of Humberside, 
although most highway authorities in the United Kingdom maintain a similar system. 
 
The STATS 19 records are transferred to the police processing authority who transcribe the 
information onto a computer database.  Whilst they are doing this they manually check the records 
for any mistakes.  These records are then validated using a computer program (STATS 21) which 
checks the consistency of the data.  For example, if the carriageway type variable is coded as a 
roundabout then the junction detail variable must be coded either as a roundabout or a mini-
roundabout, otherwise the record is flagged as being inconsistent and would be manually corrected. 
  
 
The data are sent to the highway authority who plot the accident onto a paper map and code its grid 
reference onto the computer.  The grid reference refers to the bottom left hand corner of the 10 
metre square within which the accident occurred and so if an accident was located in the top right 
corner its stated co-ordinates would be 14.1 metres from the correct position.  Each STATS 19 
record is again manually checked and any mistakes corrected.  The STATS 21 program is rerun to 
check the variables that have been altered and the data are sent to the Department of Transport who 
compile the national accident statistics (Department of Transport, 1992).   
 
It is inevitable that mistakes will be made because the police have many duties to perform at the 
scene of an accident.  Those accidents that are notified to the police by an involved party are also 
likely to have mistakes because most individuals are not trained to collect this information.  The 
existence of these mistakes are not important provided a system is available which can identify 
them.  The following section explains an improved system which quantifies the number of mistakes 
remaining for certain items after the current validation procedure has been undertaken. 
 
 
3.DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW VALIDATION SYSTEM 
 
3.1DATA SOURCES 
 
This section describes the process required to identify mistakes in the accident report form using a 
GIS.  The variables that were investigated consisted of; 
 
Road class; 
Road number; 
District; 
Speed limit; 
Pedestrian crossing facilities; 
Carriageway type and markings; 
Junction detail; 
Junction control. 
 
The correct type of feature at each location was obtained from a number of sources.  Ordnance 
Survey maps provided information on road class, road number and the district boundaries.  The 
location of speed limit signs, pedestrian crossing facilities and junction control type (ie: signalised, 
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stop or give way) were obtained from paper maps within the Accident Investigation Section of 
Humberside County Council.  Information on junction detail (ie: crossroads or T junction) and 
carriageway type were also obtained from Ordnance Survey maps although a field survey was 
required to check its accuracy.  The information contained in these sources is likely to be more 
accurate than that from the police because it is taken directly from maps and a more detailed 
investigation has been undertaken to obtain the data.  The coding of several items, such as whether 
an accident occurred at a T or Y junction is open to some interpretation.  In this case, only one 
individual coded the network and so at least there would be consistency in the recording of these 
items. 
 
3.2CODING THE HIGHWAY FEATURES 
 
Alternative procedures to obtain the coded information for the above variables were required 
because of differences in the nature of the data used.  Figure 1 highlights the method of coding the 
highway features for the above variables.  The OSCAR data contains digitised links and nodes and 
so the variables relating to these (ie; junction detail, junction control, road class, road number and 
speed limit) required less data manipulation than for the others.  The location of pedestrian crossing 
facilities had to be manually plotted onto the digital map. 
 
For each variable the computer drew a boundary around all the respective links or nodes relating to 
it.  This was necessary because the grid references for each accident are derived from paper maps 
which do not necessarily correspond to the road centre-lines or junction nodes of the digital map.  
All accidents falling within this zone could then be considered to be associated with that feature.  
For the variables of road class, road number, junction detail and junction control the radius of the 
zone was 24 metres.  This consisted of:  
 
the average distance between the centre-line and the edge of the carriageway (3.6 metres);  
the maximum error in the Ordnance Survey maps (0.4 metres); 
the maximum distance to which an accident is considered to occur at a junction (20 metres).  
 
The distance of 24 metres was also used for the variables of carriageway type and speed limit to 
retain consistency in the investigation method.  For pedestrian crossing type, any accident located 
within 50 metres of a facility should have the crossing type coded.  Hence, the area of influence 
around each facility was set at 50 metres.  This would include some roads which were not 
associated with the road that the facility is located on, for example, those running parallel.  The 
sphere of influence was therefore narrowed to include only those accidents that occurred within 24 
metres of the centre-line of that road.  The development of a wide sphere of influence could lead to 
some of the accidents in the carriageway type and speed limit investigation to be shown as incorrect 
even though they were not.  That is, correctly coded accidents on a different road but inside the 
boundary of another feature will be identified as incorrect. 
 
Some junctions or pedestrian crossings may be sufficiently close to one another for the zones to 
merge, and so the boundaries are split half way between the two features.  For road class, road 
number, speed limit and carriageway type the zones are divided at the specific changeover point 
from one feature to another, although, if this is at a junction the zone will be split 24 metres from the 
centre of the junction along the joining road. 
 
For district, the boundaries are digitised into the computer, and because they already represent 
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polygons no other manipulation is required. 
  
For each variable, the zones were coded with the respective numeric value following the criteria 
stated on the STATS 19 form, for example, an A class road would be coded as 3.  The areas outside 
the boundaries were coded as zero. 
 
3.3IDENTIFYING MISTAKES IN THE ACCIDENT VARIABLES 
 
A flow diagram of the procedure to identify mistakes in the accident variables is shown in Figure 2. 
 The accidents to be validated were selected and saved to a file.  They were then located onto a 
digital map using the grid references stated on the accident record.  The information describing each 
zone  (including feature code) is linked to each accident located within its boundaries.  An enquiry 
is then run to identify any accident where the coding taken from the highway network was different 
to that on the accident record.  A more complex enquiry was needed to identify mistakes in road 
class and number, because for accidents occurring within 20 metres of a junction the class and 
number of the road that the accident was located on and also the road that it joins are recorded as 
separate fields.  Hence, if an accident was located within the boundary of a classified road it would 
only be identified as incorrect if the highway feature code was different to the class or number in 
both fields.   
 
For each variable investigated a locational plot (see Figure 3) and a table (see Table 1) was 
produced for all accidents identified as incorrect.  The table contains the accident details including 
its reference number, a description of the location and the coding of the feature from the STATS 19 
record and from the highway feature data.  The dates that features were altered were also supplied 
and so those accidents that were incorrectly coded but occurred before the feature was altered would 
not be considered to be incorrect.  Those accidents that were incorrectly located could be moved and 
those coded incorrectly could have that variable altered. 
 
 
4.RESULTS 
 
The number of mis-codings and mis-locations for each variable are shown in Table 2. 
The mistakes in the variables of district, speed limit, road class and road number were less than 10 
per cent, less than 20 per cent for junction control, junction detail and pedestrian crossing facilities 
and over 20 per cent for carriageway type.  For all variables the accidents that were mis-located 
were generally randomly distributed throughout the network, but were usually close to the road that 
they should have been located on.  This indicates that the mistakes probably arise from mistakes in 
selecting which 10 metre grid box the accident should be located within.  Conversely, those 
accidents that were mis-coded were concentrated among several features.  The following sections 
contain a more detailed analysis of the results. 
 
4.1ROAD CLASS 
 
Of those accidents that were mis-coded (see Table 3) 81.5 per cent were coded as unclassified and 
located on the B class road.  In fact, 16.4 per cent of accidents on this road were coded with the 
incorrect class which indicates that in many instances the police were not aware that this was a 
classified road.   
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4.2ROAD NUMBER 
 
There was a total of 82 accidents identified as incorrect, of which 78 were also identified when the 
road class variable was checked for mistakes.  There is a close correlation between the two variables 
because the current computer validation procedure identifies accidents which are stated to occur on 
classified roads where road number is not included and vice versa.  Only those accidents that were 
incorrectly coded as unclassified and contained no road number and those that were incorrectly 
coded as classified and contained a road number would not be identified by the current validation 
system.  This system though, can identify these accidents.  The accidents that were mis-coded are 
shown in Table 4 and the same explanations apply to this variable as to road class.  There were four 
extra accidents identified as incorrect,of which two were coded as 6, which was the code for the 
road class and two had an incorrect number even though class was correct.   
  
4.3DISTRICT 
 
There was a total of 17 accidents identified as incorrect and all were mis-coded.  One of these was 
located only 2 metres from the boundary and because of the possible errors when drawing the 
district boundaries it was not considered to be incorrect.  Only one out of the 45 accidents located 
less than 100 metres from the district boundary was coded incorrectly.  This low figure may be 
because large signs have been erected at the boundaries stating the change from one district to 
another.  Most of the mistakes occurred at locations greater than 300 metres from the boundary 
where these signs would not be visible.  In the rural areas signs are often not erected at these points 
and so there may be a greater number of mistakes. 
 
4.4SPEED LIMIT 
 
There were 97 accidents identified by the GIS validation system as being incorrect, but after 
comparison with the locational text three accidents occurred on roads subject to a 30 mph speed 
limit but inside the 40 mph speed limit boundary and hence were correct.  The coding mistakes are 
shown in Table 5.  Four of these did not have a standard speed and so an extra enquiry using the 
current non-geographic system should be included which could identify them.  
 
The majority of the discrepancies (74.5 per cent) were between 30 and 40 mph roads.  This is to be 
expected because it is an urban area with 97.8% of accidents subject to a speed limit within this 
range.  The proportion of coding mistakes for accidents subject to 60 and 70 mph speed limits is 
therefore significantly higher than that for 30 and 40 mph roads, Ȥ2 = 85.4 with 1 d.f, p< 0.01.  This 
indicates the difficulties in coding this variable in the peripheral sections of the urban areas where 
the speed limit may not relate to the land use of the surrounding area which usually dictates it. 
 
4.5PEDESTRIAN CROSSING FACILITIES 
 
A comparison of the coding between the STATS 19 records and the highway feature database is 
shown in Table 6.  The location of refuges were not included in this study because the installation 
dates were not obtainable. 
 
There are 3.2 times as many accidents located within the 50 metres boundary but coded as outside 
than those located outside the 50 metre boundary which are coded as inside.  This bias leads to 
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pedestrian crossing facilities being shown to be safer than they actually are.  The number of 
accidents occurring within 50 metres of a pedestrian crossing facility should increase by 37.9 per 
cent and this ranges from 11.6 per cent at zebra crossings to 350 per cent at subways.  The existence 
of subway facilities are difficult to identify because they are not at grade and so many would not be 
identified. 
 
 
Many accidents located within 50 metres of signals with a pedestrian phase were coded as pelicans 
and an additional 23 accidents were stated as being located within 50 metres of a refuge but were 
located within the boundary of a traffic signal.  At these sites the refuges were used to stagger the 
pedestrian crossings and so should be counted as a signalised junction with a pedestrian phase since 
this is the dominant feature type. 
  
4.6JUNCTION DETAIL 
 
Private drives and other junctions (such as alleyways) were not coded onto the map and so accidents 
occurring at these types of junction were not checked for mistakes.  Those accidents that could not 
be accurately located from the text were stated as being mis-coded.  Of the 124 accidents that were 
mis-located, 85.5 per cent of them were those accidents which were coded as 20 metres or less from 
a junction but located outside this boundary.  This is because for most junction accidents the 
locational text states more than one road and so the accident can precisely located, whilst for many 
non-junction accidents only the road name is included. 
 
Table 7 compares the coding of junction detail between the STATS 19 records and the highway 
feature data.  There were 3.2 times as many accidents located within the junction boundary but 
coded as not at a junction than those located outside the junction boundary and coded as occurring 
at a junction which is the same level as for pedestrian crossing facilities.  This bias results in an 
underestimation of junction accidents to the order of 3 per cent. 
 
T-junctions accounted for 63.5 per cent of the mis-coded accidents.  This is to be expected because 
65.7 per cent of junction accidents occurred at this type of facility.  The same comparison can be 
made for crossroads which contained 22.4 per cent of junction accidents and 19.1 per cent of mis-
coded accidents. 
 
There were 44 accidents that were coded as occurring at a junction but contained an incorrect 
junction code, of which 66.3 per cent were discrepancies between cross-roads and T-junctions.  This 
highlights the difficulty in distinguishing between these types of junction. 
 
4.7JUNCTION CONTROL 
 
All the accidents that were coded as occurring within 20 metres of a junction but were located 
outside this boundary, and all the accidents coded as not within 20 metres of a junction but were 
located within this boundary were identified in the junction detail investigation.  This included all 
the accidents that were mis-located and 55.9 per cent of the mis-coded accidents.  Uncontrolled 
junctions were not investigated because the majority of accidents (66.9 per cent) occurred on private 
drives or other junctions.  Table 8 compares the coding of junction control between the STATS 19 
records and highway feature data. 
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There were 49 accidents coded as give-way which were within the boundary of traffic signals.  Both 
give-way and traffic signals existed at these sites and so all of these accidents must relate to signals 
as well as give-ways (except possibly for rear end shunts on the give-way leg).  There is no 
guidance in the manual which explains the coding of these variables as to which type of junction 
control should be coded in these circumstances although traffic signals are the most dominant 
control type and should be coded as such. 
 
 
4.8CARRIAGEWAY TYPE AND MARKINGS 
 
A total of 402 accidents were identified as incorrect for this variable, although 8 were correctly 
coded accidents located on a different road but inside the boundary of another carriageway feature.  
A comparison of the coding between the STATS 19 records and the highway feature data is shown 
in Table 9.  The types of carriageway with the greatest level of mis-coding were for dual two lane, 
single three lane and single 4 or more lanes.  This is because of difficulties in coding the 
carriageway type at junctions with turning lanes and along roads with bus lanes. 
 
There were 43 mis-coded accidents located at junctions where the number of lanes were increased 
to facilitate turning traffic.  There were: 
 
14 accidents coded as single 3 lane when the general carriageway type was single 2 lane; 
13 accidents coded as single 4 lane when the general carriageway type was single 2 lane; 
16 accidents coded as dual 3 or more lanes each way when the general carriageway type was dual 2 
lanes each way. 
 
There is no guidance in the manual which explains the coding of the variables as to whether this 
item should be coded to include these lanes or not.  But for the purpose of analysis the general 
carriageway characteristics would be more useful. 
 
Of the accidents that were mis-coded, 192 occurred along a 2.75 kilometre stretch of road 
incorporating a bus lane.  This section included three and four lane single carriageway road 
incorporating a bus lane and sections of two lane single carriageway road without a bus lane due to 
road width limitations.  Only 29.8 per cent of accidents along this stretch of road were coded 
correctly.  The level of accuracy for the individual section types were: 
 
58.2 per cent for single four lane; 
82.6 per cent for single two lane; 
1.4 per cent for single three lane with a 5 metre lane in one direction and two 2.5 metre lane in the 
opposite direction( one of which was a bus lane). 
 
These results indicate that bus lanes were generally not considered as a lane in carriageway type.  
They should be included because vehicles use these lanes at all times, even though some classes of 
traffic are prohibited during certain periods.  Bus lanes do not continue across junctions and it could 
be argued that at these points single two lane carriageway exists.  But, the general characteristic of 
the road is still single three lane carriageway and the small gap in the sections cannot really be 
regarded as a change in carriageway type. 
 
A further study to investigate the accuracy of the carriageway type variable on roads with bus lanes 
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would be useful to ascertain whether the results of this study are unique.  There also needs to be a 
directive as to whether turning lanes at junctions should be added to the standard number of lanes in 
the coding of carriageway type. 
 
 
5.CONCLUSIONS 
 
This GIS based validation system has successfully verified mistakes in the coding and locating of 
accidents not identified by the current system.  For the variables of road class, road number, speed 
limit and district the level of mistakes were less than 10 per cent.  This low figure is probably 
because the features are unambiguous and are recognised by people with some local knowledge.  
The level of mistakes for pedestrian crossing facilities, junction detail and junction control were 
between 10 and 20 per cent.  All require the estimation of distance and so it is probably inevitable 
that a greater number of mistakes will be made.  Carriageway type was the most inaccurately coded 
variable, mainly due to uncertainty as to whether bus lanes should be coded as an additional lane or 
not.  This may be a peculiarity of the sample and a larger study should be undertaken to identify if 
this phenomenon is unique. 
 
This system would be particularly useful as part of a routine validation procedure, but to achieve 
this it is necessary to update, move and add highway features.  Figure 4 shows the procedures 
required to accomplish this.  One of the major problems of the current method is the locating of 
accidents by the bottom left hand corner of the 10 metre square.  Some local authorities already use 
a GIS to code accidents directly onto the digital map.  A commonly available computer programme 
is then used to move then accident to the road centre-line or junction intersection (if the accident 
occurred less than 20 metres from a junction).  The GIS validation programme can then be used to 
check the accuracy of the variables.  This is a more accurate method of locating accidents and 
removes the need for a wide zone boundary which can allow correctly coded accidents on a 
different road, but inside the boundary of another feature to be identified as incorrect. 
  
The checking of errors could be expanded to include vehicle details.  About 90 per cent of the 
vehicles on the STATS 19 records were linked to the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency 
(DVLA) database using the variable of registration plate (Department of Transport, 1992) and this 
information could be used to validate the variables of maximum gross weight and vehicle suffix. 
 
If all highway authorities adopt such a system it could mean that over 2.2  million fewer items of 
data need to be collected nationally by the police.  The annual costs of recording changes in the road 
network are likely to be minimal and the information could be used for other purposes.   The system 
could ultimately result in a greater level of accuracy and cost efficiency in collecting the data.  
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Table 1:A sample printout of details from accidents with road class identified as incorrect. 
 
Accident reference number STATS 19 code Highway feature code Location 
96887 6 0 FAIRFAX AVE/BRICKNELL AVE XRDS HULL 
16988 6 0 A1079 BEVERLEY RD/SCULCOATES LA/QUEENS RD 
39590 3 6 A1174 ABOUT 200 M NORTH OF DUNSWELL RBOUT 
9591 4 6 B1233 COTTINGHAM RD/HALLRD/HOTHAM RD 
159690 6 4 THWAITE ST 50M EAST JW THE PADDOCK 
113591 6 4 HULL RD JW BRICKNELL AVENUE 
143290 6 4 COTTINGHAM RD JW HARDY STREET 
47290 4 6 COTTINGHAM RD 100YRDS WEST JW NEWLAND AVE 
125187 3 6 A1079 BEVERLEY RD JW PEARSON AVENUE HULL 
61090 3 6 A1079 BEVERLEY RD JW GROVE STREET HULL 
 
 
Table 2:The number of accidents mis-coded and mis-located for several variables on the STATS 19 
record. 
 
Variable Number 
Mis-coded 
Number 
Mis-located 
Percentage 
mistakes 
Road class 27 51 4.1 
Road number 31 51 4.4 
Speed limit 83 45 6.8 
District 16 0 0.8 
Pedestrian facilities 282 46 15.3 
Carriageway type 346 48 20.9 
Junction detail 115 121 12.5 
Junction control 127 121 13.2 
 
 
Table 3:A comparison in the coding of road class between the STATS 19 records and highway 
feature data. 
 
 Highway feature  data  
 STATS 19 data 
 
A B Unclassified 
 A 500  
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 B 134  
 Unclassified 5 22 1223 
Table 4:A comparison in the coding of road number between STATS 19 records and highway 
feature data. 
 
 Highway feature data   
   
     
STATS 19 
data 
 1079 1165 1174 1233 None 
 1079 422     
 1165  67    
 1174 1  9   
 1233    134  
 None 2 3  22 1221 
 Other 1    2 
 
 
Table 5:A comparison in the coding of speed limit between STATS 19 records and highway feature 
data. 
 
 Highway feature data   
   
    
STATS 19 
data 
 30 40 60 70 
 30 1677 41 3  
 40 20 96 6 2 
 60 2 1 28  
 70  1 3  
 Other 4    
 
Table 6:A comparison in the coding of pedestrian crossing facilities between STATS 19 records and 
highway feature data. 
 
 Highway feature data       
STATS 19 
data 
 Zebra Pelican Signal Subway Others Outside 
 Zebra 60     10 
 Pelican  129 30   36 
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 Signal   42   7 
 Subway    5  1 
 Others   23  17  
 Outside 18 81 54 22  1349 
Table 7:A comparison in the coding of junction detail between STATS 19 records and highway 
feature data. 
 
 hway feature data
STATS 19 
data 
 Not within 20 
metres 
Roundabout Mini-
roundabout 
T Y Slip road Crossroads Multiple Private 
drive 
Other 
 Not within 20 
metres 
543 46 8
 Roundabout 1 69 1 1
 Mini-roundabout 1 3
 T 13 756 1 11
 Y 2 5 3
 Slip road 1
 Crossroads 3 17 274
 Multiple 3
 Private drive 109 
 Other 3 9
 
 
Table 8:A comparison in the coding of junction control between STATS 19 records and highway 
feature data. 
 
 Highway feature 
data 
     
STATS 19 data  Give-way Stop Signal Uncontrolled Not within 
 20 metres 
 Give-way 876  49  13 
 Stop 3     
 Signal 4  195  4 
 Uncontrolled    142  
 Not within  
20 metres 
52  2  543 
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Table 9:A comparison in the coding of carriageway type and markings between STATS 19 records 
and highway feature data. 
 
 Highway feature 
data 
        
STATS 19 
data 
 Roundabout One way Dual 2 
lanes 
Dual 3 or more 
lanes 
Single track Single 2 
lanes 
Single 3 
lanes 
Single 4 or more 
lanes 
 Roundabout 71     3   
 One way  3    1   
 Dual 2 lanes   154   7 2 15 
 Dual 3 or more 
lanes 
  21   2 3 2 
 Single track     3 3   
 Single 2 lanes 1 4 11   1127 113 52 
 Single 3 lanes   1   26 25 14 
 Single 4 or more 
lanes 
     22 32 155 
 Unknown      10  1 
 
